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SOCIAL COHESION, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, AND
THE EFFECT OF PROTESTANTISM ON SUICIDE
Sascha O. Becker and Ludger Woessmann*
Abstract—In an economic theory of suicide, we model social cohesion of the
religious community and religious beliefs about afterlife as two mechanisms
by which Protestantism increases suicide propensity. We build a unique
microregional data set of 452 Prussian counties for 1816 to 1821 and 1869
to 1871, when religiousness was still pervasive. Exploiting the concentric
dispersion of Protestantism around Wittenberg, our instrumental variable
model finds that Protestantism had a substantial positive effect on suicide.
Results are corroborated in first-difference models. Tests relating to the two
mechanisms based on historical church attendance data and modern suicide
data suggest that the sociological channel plays the more important role.
I. Introduction
EVERY year, over 800,000 people commit suicide world-wide, making suicide a leading cause of death, in partic-
ular among young adults (World Health Organization, 2014).
This creates far-reaching emotional, social, and economic
ramifications and invokes major policy efforts to prevent
suicides. In the scientific literature, religious denomination
has long been observed as an important factor related to
suicide. In Le suicide, a classic example of quantitative
investigation of socially framed individual behavior, Émile
Durkheim (1897) presented aggregate indicators suggest-
ing that Protestantism was a leading correlate of suicide
incidence. The proposition that Protestants have higher sui-
cide rates than Catholics has been “accepted widely enough
for nomination as sociology’s one law” (Pope & Danigelis,
1981). Even today, Protestant countries tend to have sub-
stantially higher suicide rates, suggesting that the relation of
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religion and suicide remains a vital topic.1 Several contri-
butions have so far revealed the usefulness of investigating
suicide from an economics point of view (Hamermesh &
Soss, 1974; Becker & Posner, 2004; Chen et al., 2012).2
But religious denomination, a leading established correlate
of suicide in the sociological literature, has received surpris-
ingly little attention in the economics literature, despite the
recent burst of interest in issues of culture and religion.3
While the economics literature on happiness and subjec-
tive well-being considers suicide as a revealed-preference
outcome measure of utmost unhappiness (Oswald, 1997;
Layard, 2005), these analyses so far have not been linked
to religious denomination.
This paper makes three contributions to the economic
analysis of religion and suicide. First, in section II, we model
social cohesion and religious beliefs as two channels through
which Protestantism may affect suicide in the framework of
an economic theory of suicide. We show how a higher suicide
rate of Protestants relative to Catholics can be understood
as the outcome of denominational differences in community
integration and in theological doctrine. Second, in section III,
we provide new microregional evidence from Prussia in the
nineteenth century that the effect of Protestantism on sui-
cide may indeed be causal. Third, in section IV, we use this
empirical setting to devise tests that discriminate between
the sociological and the theological explanations. Our results
suggest that Protestantism is a leading explanatory factor for
suicide rates and that the sociological mechanism plays an
important, if not dominant, role.
Our empirical setting is Prussia in the nineteenth century.
Apart from mirroring the perspective of Durkheim’s (1897)
work, the nineteenth century has the advantage that virtu-
ally everybody was a member of a religious denomination
1 Among the ten OECD countries in which either Protestants or Catholics
make up over 85% of the population in 2000, the average suicide rate
among the four Protestant countries is 15.5 suicides per 100,000 inhabi-
tants, whereas it is 8.9 among the six Catholic countries (suicide data from
OECD, 2009; religion data from Barrett, Kurian, & Johnson, 2001). See also
Huang (1996) and Helliwell (2007) for cross-country studies of religion and
suicide.
2 Cutler, Glaeser, and Norberg (2001), Daly and Wilson (2009), Daly et al.
(2011), and Daly, Wilson, and Johnson (2013) are further examples.
3 The economics literature on culture and religion (Iannaccone, 1998;
Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2006; Iyer, 2016) does not emphasize suicide
as a possible outcome.
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and that religion pervaded all aspects of life. The Prussian
perspective offers the opportunity to compare nonminority
occurrences of the two religious denominations within a
common setting of political governance, institutions, juris-
diction, language, and basic culture. Combining suicide data
administered by local police departments from 1869 to 1871
with rich census data, we build a unique new microregional
data set on suicide, religion, and relevant covariates for 452
Prussian counties. We also use data from 1816 to 1821.
A fundamental challenge for empirical identification is
self-selection of more suicide-prone people into Protes-
tantism, as hypothesized already in 1919 by the neurolo-
gist Kollarits (1919). However, the endogeneity bias may
also go in the opposite direction; for example, during the
Reformation, Protestantism may have spread more easily
to regions where people were willing to take matters into
their own hands and change their lives, which may be nega-
tively related to suicide proneness. While manifold, existing
studies do not address this fundamental endogeneity prob-
lem. To identify the causal effect of Protestantism, we use
distance to Wittenberg as an instrumental variable tracing
the initial spread of the Reformation from its epicenter
(Becker & Woessmann, 2009). We vindicate the validity of
the instrument with evidence that it is orthogonal to impor-
tant correlates of suicide rates in 1517, before the start of
the Reformation.
Our results show that Protestantism had a significant pos-
itive effect on suicides in Prussia in both the early and late
nineteenth century. Protestantism increased the annual sui-
cide rate per 100,000 inhabitants, which has a mean of
thirteen suicides from 1869 to 1871, by about fifteen to
twenty suicides. Channels such as economic moderniza-
tion and literacy, which are also affected by Protestantism,
seem to play only a minor role in this effect, suggesting
that it is an effect of the Reformation per se rather than
of its nonreligious outcomes. The empirical result proves
very robust to a large set of robustness tests. In addition,
exploiting differential changes in Protestant shares across
counties between 1816 and 1871, a first-difference model
corroborates a positive effect of Protestantism on suicide.
Thus, Protestantism seems to bring positive effects for some
people and negative effects for others: For the majority of
the population, it raises economic prosperity through higher
human capital (Becker & Woessmann, 2009), but for the
select group of people in a suicidal state of mind, it may tip
the balance toward ending their lives.
We devise several tests to tentatively discriminate between
the two classes of theoretical models. All turn out to speak
in favor of the empirical importance of sociological com-
pared to theological channels. Among others, the effect of
Protestantism on suicide is lower in counties where church
attendance is high, implying closer community integration.
By contrast, according to the theological channel, higher
church attendance would indicate a more devout belief in
Protestant doctrine, consistent with higher suicide rates.
Modern individual-level data show that in 1992, suicides
are higher among Protestants than among Catholics, but
even higher among those without a religious affiliation.
By 2009, the Protestant-Catholic difference is substantially
reduced and only the religiously nonaffiliated have substan-
tially higher suicide proneness. Again, this speaks against the
theological channel because those who remain in the church
are presumably the most devout believers in Protestant
doctrine.
Our economic analysis of religion and suicide contributes
to the major debate in sociology since Durkheim (1897).
Several contributions have questioned the empirical regular-
ity that Protestants have higher suicide rates than Catholics.4
Durkheim’s theoretical hypotheses have also been subjected
to major criticism (see Pope & Danigelis, 1981). Stark,
Doyle, and Rushing (1983) go as far as finding Durkheim’s
argument “inconsistent and unconvincing” and “amazingly
uninformed and misleading about elementary features of
religion in 19th century Europe” (p. 120). In contrast, both
our evidence of a strong causal effect of Protestantism on sui-
cide in nineteenth-century Prussia and the indications that
social cohesion may have been a stronger mechanism in
this than religious doctrine corroborate Durkheim’s (1897)
original contribution.
II. A Theory of Religion-Specific Suicide
We see two classes of theoretical reasoning—one related
to social cohesion (sociological channel for short), the
other to individual religious beliefs (theological channel, for
short)—that have a bearing on the rationality of the act of
suicide in Catholicism and in Protestantism. We model these
denominational differences in the framework of an economic
theory of suicide. We briefly sketch the mechanisms here;
online appendix A presents the model in detail.
The scientific study of suicidal behavior and its preven-
tion, or suicidology, is the topic of several disciplines (online
appendix A.1). As stressed by the psychology of suicide,
most suicides are committed in a depressed mental state that
is transient and diverges from a person’s usual state of pref-
erences. But even in this state, suicidal persons may take the
costs and benefits of their action into account. In this sense,
an intertemporal utility-maximizing framework of standard
economic theory may provide insight into an understanding
of what might lead these people to carry out their suicide or
not and exit the suicidal state.
Our model framework extends the economic theory of sui-
cide developed by Hamermesh and Soss (1974) and Becker
and Posner (2004). Suicide is modeled as forward-looking
utility-maximizing behavior. We view this model as applying
to the suicidal state of mind depicted in the psychological
research, where preference parameters may differ from those
4 See Pope and Danigelis (1981), Bankston, Allen, and Cunningham
(1983), van Poppel and Day (1996), and Simpson (1998) for leading
examples of the controversy.
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during normal mental states. In a process of rational deci-
sion making, individuals in the suicidal state compare the
expected utility from living with that from death. If the latter
is greater than the former, committing suicide will maximize
utility (see online appendix A.2 for a formal derivation).
To understand how religious differences may affect the
propensity to commit suicide, we start by modeling a soci-
ological aspect of denominational differences. Durkheim
(1897) emphasized that Protestant doctrine encourages inde-
pendent thought and religious individualism, decreasing
social cohesion relative to a more unified Catholic commu-
nity, which tends to protect people from committing suicide.
If there is mutual interdependence in preferences, the fact
that there are others who would suffer from a person’s sui-
cide will tend to discourage people from committing suicide.
In terms of our simple economic model of suicide, the lower
cohesion of the Protestant community leads to the prediction
that suicide rates would be higher in Protestant communities
than in Catholic communities (see online appendix A.3 for
details).
To this sociological mechanism, we add a couple of the-
ological explanations. When afterlife is added to the model,
Protestant-Catholic differences rooted more deeply in reli-
gious doctrine affect suicidal behavior through the utility or
disutility of afterlife (see online appendix A.4 for details).
In particular, Protestantism tends to stress that human sal-
vation is by God’s grace alone, and not by any merit of
a person’s own work, whereas Catholicism allows human
deeds and sins to affect God’s judgment. Committing suicide
thus entails the disutility of foregoing paradise for Catholics
but not for Protestants. In addition, the confession of sins
is a holy sacrament in Catholicism but not in Protestantism.
Since suicide is the only sin that (by definition) can no longer
be confessed, this additionally creates a substitution effect
that diverts Catholics from committing suicide toward other
forms of behavior considered in times of desperation.
III. Evidence on the Effect of Protestantism
on Suicide in Nineteenth-Century Prussia
A. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Prussia provides uniquely rich census-based data to study
the relation of suicide, religion, and covariates at the county
level in the nineteenth century. The focus on the nineteenth
century has the advantage that religiosity was pervasive
at the time, in the sense that almost everybody had a
religious affiliation and that religion affected virtually all
dimensions of everyday life. The focus on Prussia allows
us to exploit variation between counties with nonminor-
ity Protestant and Catholic populations within the setting
of one country. In particular, the Prussian population was
about two-thirds Protestants and one-third Catholics, and
a majority of counties were close to having a uniformly
Catholic or uniformly Protestant population, so that no
denomination was an extreme minority. This may be impor-
tant to exclude that religious factors are confounded with
particular behavior in religious minorities. The religious
division of Prussian territory goes back to Reformation
times and was solidified by the exceptional individual reli-
gious freedom granted in Prussia at least since Frederick the
Great in the mid-eighteenth century. In its nineteenth-century
shape, Prussia had Wittenberg, the birthplace of the Refor-
mation, at its center, where Protestantism originated and was
conserved in its purest form. Prussia had uniform laws and
institutional frameworks, and official suicide figures were
collected as early as 1816. In contrast to cross-national anal-
yses, this makes county-level data within Prussia directly
comparable.
We have religion and suicide data for two points in time,
one early (1816 to 1821) and one late (1869 to 1871) in the
nineteenth century. Our analyses mainly focus on the latter
period when suicide data are more reliable and background
data richer. But the first time for which suicide statistics
were collected for the whole of Prussia is the 1816–1821
period (Mützell, 1825).5 The data average suicides over sev-
eral years, reducing noise due to random jumps in suicide
incidents. The data cover all 306 Prussian counties at the
time. The 1816 Population Census provides data on religion
and background controls (see online appendix C for details
on the different data sources).
We also digitized suicide statistics for 1869 to 1871,
again averaged over consecutive years. We combine these
data with a rich set of variables that the literature consid-
ers as determinants of suicide rates. Most prominent, the
1871 Population Census contains shares of Protestants in
the county population, demographic characteristics, and lit-
eracy rates (see Becker et al., 2014). It also provides shares
of the population with different forms of physical and mental
disabilities. The 1882 Occupation Census provides data on
the occupational structure, used as indicators of the stage
of industrial development. The data cover all 452 Prus-
sian counties (Kreise) at the time, divided into 11 provinces
(Provinzen) and 35 districts (Regierungsbezirke).
There is a difference in the way suicide data were col-
lected at the beginning and end of the nineteenth century
(Hilse, 1871). For 1816 to 1821, data on suicides were drawn
from the local burial and death registers, which were often
run by the church. In 1868, dedicated suicide statistics were
introduced for which the local state administration (the city
council or the local police) recorded every civilian suicide
on a separate data sheet. Background information on the per-
son committing suicide and the suicide circumstances were
collected with the explicit aim of understanding the factors
explaining suicides. The new data collection method was
used as the basis of very detailed suicide statistics from 1869
onward. The Prussian Statistical Office exerted extensive
effort to ensure high data quality and dedicated eighty pages
5 Prussian statistics have published data on suicides as a death cause since
1777 (Wilke, 2004).
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Table 1.—Descriptive Statistics, Prussia, 1871
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Suicide rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) 13.00 8.33 .00 37.06
Suicide proportion (per 1,000 deaths) 4.78 3.17 .00 15.76
Share of Protestants .64 .38 .003 1.00
Share of population < 15 years .36 .03 .23 .43
Share of population > 60 years .07 .02 .03 .11
Average household size 4.79 .34 3.83 5.86
Share of population living in towns .28 .22 .00 1.00
Share of labor force in manufacturing and services (1882) .34 .15 .08 .82
Share of literate adults .88 .13 .37 .99
Distance to Wittenberg (in 1,000 km) .33 .15 .00 .73
Share of females .51 .02 .44 .55
Share of Jews .01 .01 .00 .13
Share of population born in municipality .59 .12 .32 .87
Share of population of Prussian origin .99 .02 .74 1.00
Share blind (× 100) .09 .03 .03 .24
Share deaf-mute (× 100) .10 .05 .02 .42
Share insane (× 100) .23 .17 .02 1.56
Fatal accident rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) 42.35 15.80 9.37 114.52
Fatal accident proportion (per 1,000 deaths) 15.17 5.00 3.77 37.48
Latitude (in rad) .91 .03 .84 .97
Longitude (in rad) .22 .08 .11 .39
Year when annexed by Prussia 1,751.69 111.05 1,525 1,866
Suicide rates are average annual rates in 1869 to 1871. Data for 452 Prussian counties from the 1869–1871 Suicide Statistics, the 1871 Population Census, and the 1882 Occupation census. See main text and online
appendix C for details.
in its quarterly journal to providing background information
and first results on the new suicide statistics (Hilse, 1871).
The care given to data collection and the amount of detail
given in the suicide tables are impressive and reassuring
signs of data quality.6
Descriptive statistics for the 1869–1871 period in table 1
reveal that the average annual suicide rate across all Prussian
counties was 13.0 per 100,000 inhabitants, ranging between
0 in only one county (Adenau) to 37.1 (Schönau). The upper
panel of figure 1 shows substantial geographic variation in
suicide rates across Prussia. Prussian suicide levels are some-
what higher than in Germany today, where the suicide rate
was 10.3 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2004 (OECD, 2009).
The comparison of our historic data with modern data pro-
vides no indication of a systematic underreporting in the late
nineteenth century, unless one believes that suicide rates had
a significant downward trend over the twentieth century.7
Another check on whether there is systematic under-
reporting of suicides in some counties is to cross-check the
suicide data with other mortality data. Because, in particular
in Catholic parishes, a religious funeral ceremony was some-
times not granted for proven suicides, there may in principle
be an incentive to underreport suicides and classify them as
fatal accidents (Kollarits, 1919). If this were the case, the
incidence of reported suicides and fatal accidents should be
negatively correlated. In our data set, suicide rates and fatal
accident rates are in fact uncorrelated; their raw correlation
6 For instance, eleven different means of suicide are provided, hanging
and drowning being the two most widespread categories (see table A.1 in
the online appendix).
7 La Vecchia, Lucchini, and Levi (1994) do not find substantial trends in
suicide rates in developed countries from 1955 to 1989, and Chen et al.
(2012) refer to substantial increases.
is −0.004 ( p-value 0.932) in the full sample and 0.110
( p-value 0.362) in the 71 counties with a Catholic share
higher than 90%. This indicates that systematic underreport-
ing of suicides is unlikely. According to Kollarits (1919),
the standard way to get a religious funeral ceremony was to
claim that the suicide was caused by aberration. In this case,
even the Catholic Church approved a religious ceremony,
and suicide rates and their denominational differences are
not misreported.
The average share of Protestants in a county was 64.2%
in 1871, against 34.5% Catholics (the remainder being 1.1%
Jews and 0.2% other Christian denominations). Thus, both
Protestants and Catholics are not just a small minority but
constitute a sizable fraction of the Prussian population.
Furthermore, there is substantial variation across counties,
ranging essentially from 0 to 100% Protestants or Catholics.
More than 75% of the counties have a share of at least 80%
of either Protestants or Catholics, and more than 60% have
a share of at least 90% of one denominational group. In
restricted analyses, we even focus on samples of countries
where the share of Protestants is smaller than 2% or larger
than 98% or even 0.1% and 99.9%.
The bottom panel of figure 1 depicts the geographic vari-
ation of Protestant shares across Prussia. The close mapping
between the geographic distribution of Protestant shares and
suicide rates is directly evident. In fact, the raw correlation
between the two across the 452 counties is 0.66 (statistically
significant at the 1% level). When plotting the two against
each other (figure A.1 in the online appendix), there is a
clear positive association between the share of Protestants
in a county and the suicide rate, and the average suicide
rate is notably higher in all-Protestant than in all-Catholic
counties.
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Figure 1.—Suicides and Protestantism in Prussia, 1871
Suicide rate (average annual suicides per 100,000 inhabitants), 1869–1871, and share of Protes-
tants, 1871. County-level depiction based on 1869–1871 Suicide Statistics and 1871 Population Census,
respectively. See online appendix C for data details.
B. Basic Evidence from 1869 to 1871
To probe the association between Protestantism and
suicide in a multivariate setting, we estimate a simple
least-squares model,8
SUICi = α+ βPROTi + Xi γ′ + εi, (1)
where SUICi is the suicide rate in county i, PROT is the
share of Protestants in the county, and X is a set of control
variables. Our most basic set of controls includes the shares
of the county population below 15 years of age and above 60
years of age, respectively, and average household size. Such
8 Our qualitative results are confirmed in Poisson and negative binomial
regression models that use the number of suicides rather than suicide rates
as the dependent variable (not shown). Similarly, the significance of our
main results holds in models that cluster standard errors at the level of 35
districts (not shown).
measures of age and family patterns are standard determi-
nants considered in suicide equations. In richer models, we
will also consider a host of additional possible correlates of
suicide as control variables (see Helliwell, 2007, and Chen
et al., 2012, for extensive overviews of factors considered in
empirical suicide research).
The first column of table 2 shows the strong positive
association between the Protestant share and the suicide
rate. On average, all-Protestant counties have a suicide
rate that is 14.5 suicides per 100,000 inhabitants higher
than all-Catholic counties. Viewed against an average sui-
cide rate of 13.0, this is a substantial difference across
religious denominations. Column 2 adds the list of basic
demographic control variables. The significant positive asso-
ciation between Protestantism and suicide remains largely
unchanged in the multivariate specification. Suicide rates
are significantly negatively related to larger shares of young
(below 15 years) and old (over 60 years) population. The fact
that suicide initially increases with age is a standard result in
suicide research. The inversely U-shaped pattern of suicide
rates declining again with larger shares of old people may
indicate a declining suicide inclination after reaching a cer-
tain age. As an indicator of longevity, it may also capture an
effect of the level of economic development, which may pro-
tect from suicide disposition. The negative relation of suicide
rates with average household size mirrors the importance of
the family generally found in the suicide literature.
Columns 3 to 5 add further control variables. Previous
work has found urbanization, economic conditions, and edu-
cation to be factors related to suicide (Helliwell, 2007; Chen
et al., 2012). We add the share of population living in towns,
the share of the labor force working in manufacturing and
services (as a measure of economic development), and the
share of literates to the basic model. None of these measures
enters the model significantly, and the point estimate on the
share of Protestants is barely affected. Column 6 adds a set of
dummies for the 35 Prussian districts (Regierungsbezirke),
the administrative layer between counties and provinces, to
the model. This specification excludes all the variation that
exists across districts and exploits only the within-district
variation. To the extent that there is unobserved regional
heterogeneity, district dummies should capture most of its
substance. While the estimated association between Protes-
tantism and suicide is somewhat reduced in magnitude, it
remains highly robust.
Column 7 uses the suicide proportion—the number of sui-
cides divided by the flow of deaths in the same period—as
an alternative dependent variable. This measure takes into
account that average mortality rates differ across counties.
Again, there is a significant association of Protestantism with
suicides. The lower point estimate is in line with the smaller
value range of this variable (see table 1).
C. Identifying Exogenous Variation in Protestantism
A concern with the evidence so far is that religious affilia-
tion may not be exogenous to the suicide model. Specifically,
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Table 2.—Protestantism and Suicide in Prussia, 1871
Dependent Variable Suicide Rate Suicide Proportion
(per 100,000 inhabitants) (per 1,000 deaths)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share of Protestants 14.496 12.328 12.306 12.411 12.528 9.812 4.928
(.669)∗∗∗ (.612)∗∗∗ (.611)∗∗∗ (.634)∗∗∗ (.705)∗∗∗ (.906)∗∗∗ (.272)∗∗∗
Share of population < 15 years −70.781 −66.868 −66.580 −67.552 −57.218 −21.537
(10.911)∗∗∗ (15.498)∗∗∗ (15.590)∗∗∗ (15.811)∗∗∗ (17.233)∗∗∗ (6.394)∗∗∗
Share of population > 60 years −30.120 −23.869 −22.354 −15.241 13.799 9.570
(18.102)∗ (23.812) (24.118) (27.741) (34.247) (11.133)
Average household size −7.575 −7.529 −7.364 −7.317 −1.727 −2.077
(.758)∗∗∗ (.755)∗∗∗ (.771)∗∗∗ (.761)∗∗∗ (1.568) (.285)∗∗∗
Share of population living in towns .754 .091 .089 .212 .548
(1.838) (1.862) (1.867) (1.826) (.686)
Share of labor force in manufacturing 1.807 2.437 5.550 .118
and services (1882) (1.683) (2.089) (2.646)∗∗ (.790)
Share of literate adults −1.614 3.900 .020
(3.054) (4.040) (1.123)
35 district dummies Yes
Constant 3.691 68.928 66.655 65.148 65.868 23.571 18.352
(.370)∗∗∗ (5.626)∗∗∗ (8.046)∗∗∗ (8.464)∗∗∗ (8.738)∗∗∗ (13.034)∗ (3.372)∗∗∗
Observations 452 452 452 452 452 452 452
R2 .433 .627 .627 .628 .628 .738 .611
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: Significant at ∗10%, ∗∗5%, and ∗∗∗1%. Data for Prussian counties from the 1869–1871 Suicide Statistics, the 1871
Population Census, and the 1882 Occupation Census. See main text and online appendix C for details.
whether a person adheres to a specific faith may to some
extent be a choice variable that is correlated with the error
term of equation (1). For example, in the early twentieth
century, Kollarits (1919), a Hungarian publishing in a Ger-
man journal of neurology and psychiatry, hypothesized that
the higher incidence of suicide among Protestants may sim-
ply result from selection of suicide-prone people into the
Protestant denomination. However, direct conversion was
in fact minimal in the nineteenth century: only 0.01% of
Catholics (or 766 out of more than 7 million Catholics) con-
verted to Protestantism per year over the period 1859 to
1867, mostly in the course of marriage to a Protestant partner
(Hilse, 1869).
But endogeneity may take another form of unobserved
heterogeneity, in that three centuries earlier, during the Ref-
ormation, regional conversion to the new Protestant faith
may not have been orthogonal to suicide proneness, which
may exhibit strong intertemporal persistence. Most of the
denominational variation across Prussia in the nineteenth
century can be traced back to denominational choices of
local rulers in the roughly 300 political entities that made
up Germany during the Reformation in the sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries, mostly motivated by religious
conviction and power politics vis-à-vis the pope and the Ger-
man emperor. While it seems unlikely that the adoption of
Protestantism was directly related to pre-Reformation pat-
terns in suicide, it might have been indirectly related to
correlates of suicide such as economic conditions, urban-
ity, education, and mental disposition. For example, regions
where people are naturally inclined to try to change a bad
status quo rather than giving up may have been more will-
ing to adopt the new denomination that emerged from a
protest movement (“Protestantism”), and such people may
also be less prone to commit suicide when matters turn bad.
Such issues of causality pose a fundamental challenge for
empirical identification that has not been directly addressed
in the (mostly sociological) literature so far.
To identify exogenous variation, we exploit the concentric
spread of the Reformation from Wittenberg, where Luther
initiated the new denomination. As is visible in the bot-
tom panel of figure 1, the Reformation spread in the areas
around Wittenberg but was less successful farther away from
Wittenberg. The geographically concentric dispersion of the
Reformation allows us to employ an instrumental variable
(IV) strategy that uses a county’s distance to Wittenberg as
an instrument for the share of Protestants in the county. We
thereby restrict the analysis to a specific part of the denomi-
national variation that is arguably exogenous to variation in
important drivers of suicide rates. Our identifying assump-
tion, which we probe in greater detail below, is that the
concentric pattern is unrelated to suicide apart from its effect
through Protestantism.
Table 3 reports results of the IV estimation of the effect
of Protestantism on suicide rates. Distance to Wittenberg is
a strong instrument for the share of Protestants in a county,
as is evident from an F-statistic of the instrument in the first
stage of 23 to 47 (depending on the included controls). Each
100 km distance to Wittenberg is associated with a Protestant
share that is 7 to 9 percentage points lower (columns 1 to
4). The second stage uses only that part of the variation in
Protestant shares that is due to distance to Wittenberg to
predict suicide rates.
The positive effect of Protestantism on suicide rates is
highly robust in the IV specifications (columns 5 to 8). In
fact, the IV point estimates are significantly higher than the
OLS estimates. Depending on the model, a 10 percentage
point increase in the share of Protestants in a county
increases the suicide rate by 2.0 to 2.4 suicides per 100,000
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Table 3.—Instrumental Variable Estimates Using Distance to Wittenberg
Dependent Variable First Stage Second Stage
Share of Protestants Suicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share of Protestants 28.019 20.485 19.969 24.016
(3.051)∗∗∗ (2.672)∗∗∗ (2.417)∗∗∗ (3.836)∗∗∗
Distance to Wittenberg (in 1,000 km) −.936 −.863 −.909 −.693
(.137)∗∗∗ (.145)∗∗∗ (.136)∗∗∗ (.145)∗∗∗
Share of population < 15 years −.599 −.747 .093 −68.989 −67.873 −79.150
(.739) (.742) (.738) (17.176)∗∗∗ (17.065)∗∗∗ (18.385)∗∗∗
Share of population > 60 years −2.550 −3.177 −7.136 −23.759 −19.051 61.177
(1.587) (1.491)∗∗ (1.620)∗∗∗ (27.266) (26.607) (45.356)
Average household size −.155 −.195 −.226 −5.467 −5.163 −3.845
(.059)∗∗∗ (.059)∗∗∗ (.059)∗∗∗ (1.159)∗∗∗ (1.179)∗∗∗ (1.590)∗∗
Share of population living in towns −.048 .149 .172 −.686 −2.604 −3.605
(.101) (.104) (.099)∗ (1.968) (2.084) (2.345)
Share of labor force in manufacturing −.587 −.940 5.628 14.021
and services (1882) (.122)∗∗∗ (.130)∗∗∗ (2.509)∗∗ (4.855)∗∗∗
Share of literate adults 1.053 −17.929
(.200)∗∗∗ (6.076)∗∗∗
Constant .947 2.084 2.535 1.797 −4.988 52.669 49.416 51.711
(.038)∗∗∗ (.454)∗∗∗ (.443)∗∗∗ (.451)∗∗∗ (2.084)∗∗ (11.255)∗∗∗ (11.467)∗∗∗ (13.031)∗∗∗
Observations 452 452 452 452 452 452 452 452
R2 .135 .152 .189 .235 .056 .498 .521 .406
F-statistic (instrument) 46.807 35.547 44.882 22.793
Instrumental variable (IV) estimation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: Significant at ∗10%, ∗∗5%, and ∗∗∗1%. Data for Prussian counties from the 1869–1871 Suicide Statistics, the 1871
Population Census, and the 1882 Occupation Census. See main text and online appendix C for details.
inhabitants. The pattern of IV and OLS results suggests
that without the Reformation, suicide rates would have been
lower in regions that turned Protestant due to their proximity
to Wittenberg (“compliers”) than in regions that remained
Catholic. This negative bias in the OLS estimates is con-
sistent with a Reformation pattern where regions with a less
suicide-prone population tended to select into Protestantism.
D. Validity of the Instrumental Variable Strategy
The validity of the IV model rests on the assumption
that the initial concentric spread of the Reformation led
to exogenous variation in the Protestant share (see online
appendix B.1 for details on the analyses summarized in
this section). Factors that likely contributed to the historical
diffusion process include costs of traveling and informa-
tion diffusion, increasing dissimilarity of dialects, Electoral
Saxony as an early role model, regional political alliances,
and historical randomness. Consistent data on suicide rates
before the Reformation are not available. But the lack of a
significant association of the distance-to-Wittenberg instru-
ment with several proxies of suicide proneness observed
before the onset of the Reformation—including proxies
for economic conditions, urbanity, education, and cultural
predisposition—lends credibility to assuming exogeneity of
the instrument. There is also ample anecdotal evidence that
the initial spread of Protestantism was indeed associated with
increases in suicide incidences.
Still, the fact that we have shown in Becker and Woess-
mann (2009) that Protestantism affected literacy and eco-
nomic development raises a question of interpretation: Was
it these other outcomes of the Reformation, rather than
Protestantism per se, that led to the increase in suicides?
As shown in table 3, the estimated effect of the Protestant
share on suicide rates is largely unaffected by conditioning
on the share of the workforce that moved out of agriculture,
and it in fact increases (although not statistically signifi-
cantly so) when conditioning on the share of literate adults,
which is significantly negatively associated with suicides in
this specification. This suggests that the estimated effect of
Protestantism on suicides is barely affected by any effect of
the Reformation on literacy and economic development. This
conclusion is corroborated when adding controls for further
dimensions of educational and economic development and
for proxies for two additional potential nonreligious out-
comes of the Reformation, income inequality and the number
of social protests (see table A.2 in the online appendix). Nei-
ther measure enters significantly or affects the estimate on
Protestantism. Overall, the results seem most consistent with
a strong effect of Protestantism per se on suicides.
E. Robustness Analyses
As shown in online appendix B, the empirical results prove
very robust to a large set of robustness tests. Among oth-
ers, we control for additional demographic variables such
as gender, the share of Jews, internal and external migra-
tion, and the share of married people (see table A.3 in the
online appendix). To account for differences in suicides that
stem from aspects of general mental illness that are not well
depicted in a rational choice framework, we use information
on the share of people classified as having physical or mental
disabilities, including being “insane.” This measure does not
vary by denomination in our data, and holding the shares of
people with different disabilities constant does not affect our
results. In addition, we can add geographic controls, such as
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latitude, longitude, and their interaction; altitude; and a set
of dummies indicating the year in which the county became
part of Prussia. We also control for local weather conditions
such as rainfall and temperature (table A.4 in the online
appendix).
To rule out bias from denomination-specific reporting
bias, we analyze whether some suicides might be hidden
as fatal accidents or other alternative death causes. Neither
fatal accident rates nor total mortality rates are higher in
Protestant areas, and controlling for the fatal accident rate
does not alter our results (see table A.5 in the online appen-
dix). To account for denominational sorting into occupations
with different frequencies of fatal accidents, we also include
an extensive set of controls for employment shares in 32
sectors. Results are also robust when using the suicide pro-
portion (suicides per death incidents) rather than the suicide
rate (suicides per inhabitants) as an alternative outcome
measure.
We also look into effects of religious minorities and
religious concentration (table A.6 in the online appendix).
Cross-tabulated data confirm that the county-level results do
not derive from ecological fallacy (table A.7 in the online
appendix). They also allow us to probe into denomination-
specific suicides by gender and effects of being a religious
minority on suicide, rejecting the existence of important
nonlinearities in the effect of Protestantism on suicide.
F. Evidence from 1816 to 1821
While the 1869–1871 data are in the first statistical investi-
gation specifically devised to analyze suicides, official burial
and death registers provide data on suicides as early as 1816
to 1821. These are the earliest data covering all of Prus-
sia, again available at the county level. Suicide rates are
reported separately by gender for each county. On average,
male suicide rates are about four times higher than female
suicide rates (see table A.8 in the online appendix). The set
of control variables available in the 1816 Population Census
is not as rich as in the later data. However, the same types of
basic demographic control variables are available: the share
of the population younger than 15 years and the share older
than 60 years, as well as the share of the population living
in towns. Furthermore, the number of public buildings per
capita can serve as an indicator of economic development
and the enrollment rate in primary schools as a measure of
education, and we again have information on fatal accident
rates.
At 6.5 suicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the average sui-
cide rate in the 1816–1821 data is only half the average
suicide rate reported in the 1869–1871 data. This raises the
concern of possible underreporting of suicides in the official
burial and death registers, where some of the suicides may be
classified as fatal accidents. This may be particularly the case
where priests denied a church burial ceremony for those who
committed suicide (a practice prohibited by Prussian law
only in 1845; see Hilse, 1871). However, while underreport-
ing of suicides might affect the size of the estimated effects, it
would affect the qualitative results only to the extent that the
degree of underreporting varies by denomination. If we take
the 1869–1871 data as a benchmark, we can assess the rela-
tive difference in reported suicides over time for Protestant
and Catholic counties. Counties with a share of Protestants
higher than 90% have an average suicide rate of 9.3 suicides
per 100,000 inhabitants in 1816 to 1821, compared to 17.4 in
1869 to 1871. In Protestant counties, reported suicides from
1816 to 1821 are thus lower by a factor of 1.9. Counties with
a share of Catholics higher than 90% have an average sui-
cide rate of 2.8 from 1816 to 1821, compared to 4.7 for 1869
to 1871. In Catholic counties, reported suicides from 1816
to 1821 are thus lower by a factor of 1.7. This is an indica-
tion that, if anything, Protestants underreport slightly more
in the 1816–1821 period compared to Catholics not only in
absolute terms but even in relative terms, putting the stakes
against finding an effect of Protestantism for 1816 to 1821.
In addition, we can again control for fatal accident rates in
our regressions to guard against bias from misclassification
of suicides as fatal accidents.
Suicide rates in all-Protestant counties are 7.2 larger
than in all-Catholic counties on average. This difference is
reduced to 4.7 but remains highly significant in OLS regres-
sions that control for the age structure of the population,
urbanization, public buildings, and school enrollment (table
A.9 in the online appendix). Both male and female suicide
rates are significantly higher in Protestant areas. However,
as a direct corollary of the substantially higher male suicide
rates, the point estimate on Protestantism is substantially
higher for men than for women. In fact, the male effect
for 1816 to 1821 is quantitatively in the same range as the
average effect for 1869 to 1871.
Table 4 reports the IV results that use distance to Wit-
tenberg as an instrument for the share of Protestants. The
IV estimates suggest that Protestantism raises male suicide
rates by 23.4 suicides per 100,000 inhabitants, female suicide
rates by 7.1, and average suicide rates by 15.0. To exclude
possible bias from underreporting of suicides as accidents,
columns 3 to 5 control for fatal accident rates. Fatal acci-
dent rates are not significantly related to suicide rates in the
multivariate regressions, and the estimated effect of Protes-
tantism on suicide is barely affected. Again, the positive
effect of Protestantism is also evident when measuring sui-
cides per deaths rather than per inhabitants (column 6). The
1816–1821 analyses thus confirm a strong positive effect of
Protestantism on suicide also for the early nineteenth century
and show it for both genders.
G. A First-Difference Model
With data from two points in time—1816 to 1821 and
1869 to 1871—it is also possible to estimate a first-difference
model. By testing whether any change in the Protestant share
over time is associated with a contemporaneous change in
the suicide rate, such a model effectively removes county
fixed effects, disregarding any differences in the levels of
suicides and Protestantism across counties and focusing only
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Table 4.—Protestantism and Suicide in Prussia, 1816: IV Estimates
Dependent Variable: First Stage Second Stage
Share of Suicide Rate Suicide Proportion
Protestants (per 100,000 inhabitants) (per 1,000 deaths)
All All All Males Females All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of Protestants 14.989 14.971 23.439 7.066 5.240
(3.020)∗∗∗ (2.873)∗∗∗ (4.701)∗∗∗ (1.621)∗∗∗ (1.059)∗∗∗
Distance to Wittenberg (in 1,000 km) −.869
(.195)∗∗∗
Share of population < 15 years −4.251 15.253 15.117 19.218 11.345 4.804
(.943)∗∗∗ (21.538) (20.667) (33.926) (11.620) (7.797)
Share of population > 60 years −8.089 1.281 .555 4.341 −.576 7.929
(1.845)∗∗∗ (39.500) (36.464) (59.446) (21.749) (13.593)
Share of population living in towns −.078 6.570 6.566 11.932 1.922 1.809
(.088) (1.431)∗∗∗ (1.428)∗∗∗ (2.536)∗∗∗ (.900)∗∗ (.493)∗∗∗
Public buildings per capita .091 −.262 −.256 −1.900 1.278 .087
(.056) (1.165) (1.129) (1.706) (1.033) (.394)
School enrollment rate .443 −2.074 −2.045 −2.941 −1.174 −.886
(.104)∗∗∗ (1.998) (1.881) (3.160) (.963) (.676)
Fatal accident rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) −.001 .010 −.014 .0001
(.021) (.034) (.011) (.008)
Constant 2.647 −7.369 −7.225 −9.985 −4.881 −2.761
(.421)∗∗∗ (10.830) (10.029) (16.502) (5.700) (3.755)
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306
R2 .360 .024 .026 .023 .078 .092
F-statistic (instrument) 19.827 24.861 24.861 24.861 24.861
Instrumental variables (IV) estimation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: Significant at ∗10%, ∗∗5%, and ∗∗∗1%. Data for Prussian counties from the 1816 Census. See main text and online
appendix C for details.
on changes over time. The identifying assumption of this
first-difference model is quite different from our IV model
(which assumes that the concentric spread of the Protes-
tant Reformation from Wittenberg is not otherwise related
to suicide proneness). It assumes that in the absence of any
differential change in the Protestant share, there would have
been no systematic difference in the change in suicide rates.
Changes in denominational shares within counties during
this time are likely to mostly reflect migration patterns such
as movements of Polish Catholics to the coal mines of the
Ruhr area, as well as differential fertility and mortality, so
that the analysis cannot exclude selection bias. Still, the first-
difference model provides an alternative test of our main
hypothesis that Protestantism affected suicide rates.
We can perform the first-difference analysis for 272 coun-
ties (out of the 306 counties that existed in 1816) that can
be linked over time because there were no or only negli-
gible changes in their county boundaries between 1816 and
1871. The observed range of county-level changes in Protes-
tant shares is in fact quite substantial, ranging from a 25
percentage point decrease to a 22 percentage point increase
across counties. As is evident from the first column of table 5,
both the initial share of Protestants and its change over time
are significantly positively related to the change in the sui-
cide rate over time.9 The larger the increase in the Protestant
share, the larger the increase in the suicide rate. To test for
robustness to contemporaneous changes in other potentially
9 Mechanically, the change in the Protestant share is negatively correlated
with its initial level.
confounding factors, column 2 includes controls for contem-
poraneous changes in urbanization and the age structure, as
well as their initial levels. Column 3 additionally controls for
the initial level of the dependent variable, the suicide rate in
1816. The effect of changes in Protestant shares on changes
in suicide rates is highly robust in these specifications.
Despite the substantial range of observed changes in
Protestant shares over time, the majority of counties expe-
rience relatively small changes in denominational shares.
To ensure that these are not affecting the first-difference
results, columns 4 and 5 restrict the analysis to those 114
(50) counties whose Protestant shares change by at least 2 (5)
percentage points, respectively. Results are robust in these
smaller samples. The first-difference analysis thus indicates
a robust positive association between increased Protestant
shares and increased suicide rates over time.
IV. Discriminating between Sociological
and Theological Explanations
The evidence so far confirms a causal effect of Protes-
tantism on suicide, but it does not discriminate between the
sociological and the theological explanations for this effect.
In this section, we devise a series of empirical tests that try
to provide such discrimination.
A. Church Attendance and the Relevance
of Social Cohesion and Religious Beliefs
A first test to discriminate between the two types of expla-
nation builds on their differing predictions with respect to
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Table 5.—First-Difference Model on Changes between 1816 and 1871
Dependent Variable: Change in Suicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants), 1816–1871
Excluding Counties Where
Δ %Prot Δ %Prot
All Panel Counties < 2 p.p. < 5 p.p.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4)
Change in share of Protestants (1816–1871) .099 .084 .078 .091 .117
(.040)∗∗ (.037)∗∗ (.036)∗∗ (.040)∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗
Share of Protestants (1816) .081 .078 .099 .116 .143
(.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗
Change in share of population < 15 years −.048 −.144 −.187 −.329
(1816–1871) (.163) (.164) (.205) (.239)
Change in share of population > 60 years .869 1.007 .761 1.014
(1816–1871) (.288)∗∗∗ (.279)∗∗∗ (.307)∗∗ (.432)∗∗
Change in share of population living in towns −.007 .004 −.018 −.013
(1816–1871) (.026) (.026) (.028) (.029)
Share of population < 15 years (1816) −.269 −.450 −.537 −.531
(.191) (.197)∗∗ (.281)∗ (.301)∗
Share of population > 60 years (1816) .864 .695 .167 .422
(.327)∗∗∗ (.336)∗∗ (.491) (.669)
Share of population living in towns (1816) −.012 .005 −.005 −.018
(.021) (.020) (.027) (.033)
Suicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants (1816) −.333 −.419 −.604
(.078)∗∗∗ (.117)∗∗∗ (.163)∗∗∗
Constant 1.028 4.938 13.039 20.580 18.748
(.344)∗∗∗ (9.150) (9.476) (13.606) (15.085)
Observations 272 272 272 114 50
R2 .284 .365 .404 .464 .653
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on long difference in suicide rates. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: Significant at ∗10%, ∗∗5%, and ∗∗∗1%. Data for Prussian counties from the 1816
Census, the 1869–1871 Suicide Statistics, and the 1871 Population Census. See main text and online appendix C for details.
how the extent of church attendance in a community affects
suicide rates and their dependence on Protestantism. From
the sociological perspective, higher church attendance can
be viewed as a sign of greater social cohesion. Thus, even if
the integration into the Protestant community might be lower
than in the Catholic community on average, in Protestant
areas, Protestants should be relatively more closely embed-
ded in their community when more people attend church.
The sociological explanation would thus predict that higher
church attendance should dampen the effect of Protestantism
on suicide.
By contrast, from the theological perspective, higher
church attendance can be viewed as a sign of more devout
church members. Higher church attendance would thus sig-
nal stronger belief in Protestant doctrine, which should go
along with an even stronger effect of Protestantism on sui-
cide. There is ample evidence to support the assumption
that theological beliefs are more strictly believed in areas
with higher church attendance. For example, McCleary and
Barro (2006) show that the correlations of monthly atten-
dance at religious services with religious beliefs such as
belief in afterlife, God, heaven, and hell, as well as with
self-identification as a religious person, are as high as 0.86
to 0.91 across countries (see their table 9). For the United
States, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2008) show a strong sig-
nificant effect of religious beliefs (an index that combines
belief in heaven, miracles, the devil, and the Bible as lit-
eral truth) on monthly attendance at both the individual and
the metropolitan-area levels (see their tables 1, 2, and 9).
For Great Britain, Sawkins, Seaman, and Williams (1997)
show that attendance at religious services is significantly
positively associated with the intensity of religious belief
for both women and men (see their tables 1 and 2).
These opposite predictions of the two explanations on how
suicide rates change with church attendance rates provide us
with a way to test the two channels against each other. To
do so, we make use of the unique database of church atten-
dance provided by the statistical surveys of the Protestant
regional churches of Germany on the expressions of churchly
life (see Hölscher, 2001, and Becker & Woessmann, 2013,
for additional detail). First in 1862 and then more regularly
on an annual basis starting in 1881, parish priests were to
count the number of participations in Holy Communion on
a preprinted form following uniform surveying directives.
The data are available from regional archives at the level
of church districts (Kirchenkreise), usually comprising 10 to
20 adjacent parishes. Our measure of church attendance is
the number of participations in Holy Communion divided by
the number of Protestants in a church district. To match our
1869–1871 suicide statistics, we take a simple average of
church attendance in 1862 and 1881, the closest years with
available data for most church districts.10 We map the church
district data into our administrative county data by using
10 Results based on just the 1862 data are very similar. To ensure that
the averaging is not affected by overall trends in church attendance, before
taking the average of the two years, we first regress the 1862 and 1881 data
on each other and predict any missing value for a county in one year by the
predicted value from these regressions.
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Table 6.—Discriminating between Sociological and Theological Explanations, 1871
Dependent Variable: Suicide Rate
Counties with More
Than 98% Protestants All Counties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Church attendance −11.418
(3.542)∗∗∗
Share of Protestants 10.934 11.224 10.480
(1.231)∗∗∗ (1.241)∗∗∗ (1.382)∗∗∗
Bottom quartile of church attendance −2.131 −1.948
(1.409) (1.411)
Share Protestants × Bottom quartile of church attendance 4.386 3.891
(1.903)∗∗ (1.915)∗∗
Top quartile of urbanization −.952 −.558
(1.274) (1.711)
Share Protestants × Top quartile of urbanization 3.269 2.691
(1.838)∗ (1.993)
Further controls (as in table 2) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 90 396 396 396
Number of clusters 66 258 258 258
R2 .442 .642 .641 .647
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the level of church districts, in parentheses: Significant at ∗10%, ∗∗5%, and ∗∗∗1%. Sample of counties with church
attendance data (396 counties). Data for Prussian counties from the 1869–1871 Suicide Statistics, the 1871 Population Census, the 1882 Occupation Census, and the 1862–1881 Church Attendance Data. See main text
and online appendix C for details.
GIS technology to compute the surface-weighted average of
the available church district data for each county.11 In cases
where more than one county falls within the same church dis-
trict, we cluster our regression analyses at the church district
level.
We perform two types of analyses. First, we restrict the
analyses to the ninety counties (with available church atten-
dance data) that are virtually all Protestant (Protestant share
larger than 98%) to test whether Protestant church atten-
dance is significantly related to suicide rates. As is evident
from the first column of table 6, suicide rates decline signif-
icantly with higher church attendance. If church attendance
increases from the 10th to the 90th percentile in this sample
(0.402 to 0.706), suicide rates are 3.5 suicides per 100,000
inhabitants lower, equivalent to a fifth of the sample mean.
Declining suicides with increasing church attendance are in
line with the sociological channel but not the theological
channel.
Second, in the full sample, we test whether the effect
of Protestantism on suicide differs with church attendance
rates. To allow for functional flexibility, we interacted the
Protestantism effect with indicator variables for four quar-
tiles of Protestant church attendance. Given that effects for
the upper three-quartiles do not significantly differ from one
another, the specification in column 2 includes an interac-
tion only with the bottom quartile of church attendance. As
is evident, the effect of Protestantism on suicide is signifi-
cantly larger in counties where Protestant church attendance
is low. At 15.3 compared to 10.9 suicides per 100,000
inhabitants, the difference is again substantial. With higher
church attendance dampening rather than heightening the
11 We treat a county as missing data if church attendance information is
missing for more than half of its surface, but results are robust in larger
samples that include all counties with any church attendance information.
effect of Protestantism on suicide, this finding again speaks
in favor of the sociological channel and against the theo-
logical channel. Note that given the lack of evidence of a
causal effect of income on church attendance in nineteenth-
century Prussia (Becker & Woessmann, 2013), church
attendance is unlikely to capture other factors like economic
development.
An additional indication that church attendance is indeed
related to higher social cohesion among Protestants comes
from modern microdata from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP), where we can observe frequency of church
attendance and several measures of social cohesion at the
individual level. The data show that Protestants who attend
church regularly are more likely to regularly meet with
family and relatives, meet with neighbors or friends, and vol-
unteer in associations or social services than Protestants who
do not attend church regularly.12 This pattern is in line with
the interpretation that higher church attendance indicates
greater social cohesion.
B. Further Evidence on Channels from Historical Patterns
It can also be argued that the sociological aspect of a
less tightly integrated Protestant community is particularly
relevant in the anonymous environment of urban areas. By
contrast, rural communities may exhibit more social cohe-
sion irrespective of denomination, thereby dampening the
12 For example, 83.1% of Protestants who attend church at least monthly
mutually visit family members or relatives at least once per month, com-
pared to 78.1% of Protestants who attend church less regularly. The
equivalent comparisons are 83.2% versus 77.5% for mutual visits of neigh-
bors, friends, or acquaintances and 36.7% versus 14.3% for volunteering in
associations or social services. While the pattern is generally similar among
Catholics, there is an interesting contrast in that churchgoing Catholics are
less likely to meet friends on a weekly basis than non-churchgoing Catholics
(42.6% versus 47.3%; Protestants: 49.8% versus 46.7%).
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effect of Protestantism on suicide if the sociological channel
is indeed at work. The theological channel does not predict
the Protestantism effect to differ with urbanization.
Allowing for a flexible functional form, we interacted the
Protestantism effect with indicator variables for four quar-
tiles of the share of the county population living in towns.
With the lower three quartiles not significantly differing from
one another, column 3 of table 6 includes only the inter-
action with the top quartile of urbanization. The effect of
Protestantism on suicide is indeed significantly larger in
urban areas, supporting the relevance of the sociological
channel. However, as is evident from column 4, the inter-
action of Protestantism with church attendance dominates
its interaction with urbanity.
Another way to gauge the relevance of the sociological
community channel is to look at the suicide rates of Catholics
by whether they live in a predominantly Catholic or Protes-
tant area. While the results reported in the bottom panel of
table A.7 in the online appendix do not provide evidence for
systematic minority effects, suicide rates of Catholics are in
fact substantially larger in areas where Protestants have a
majority. They are below 5% in districts with less than 40%
Protestants but above 14% in districts with more than 60%
Protestants. This pattern may again cast doubt on the impor-
tance of religious beliefs in generating the observed results
and indicate instead the relevance of social structure, here in
terms of social spillovers.
C. Evidence from Modern Data
A final piece of evidence to differentiate between relevant
channels builds on modern data. In modern times even more
than before, Protestant doctrine is more accommodating with
suicides. Leading Protestant theologians have turned against
condemning suicide, arguing that an individuals can com-
mit suicide in a state of peace with God. At the same time,
the Catechism of the Catholic Church continues to be very
explicit against suicide, noting in point 2325, “Suicide is seri-
ously contrary to justice, hope, and charity. It is forbidden
by the fifth commandment.” Based on the theological chan-
nel, one might thus expect the difference in suicide rates
between true believers in Protestant and Catholic doctrine
to sharpen in modern times, especially when large num-
bers have left both churches, presumably leaving behind
members more committed to the doctrine of their church.
In contrast, if the sociological channel dominates, a smaller
flock of (firm) Protestant and Catholic believers should both
find consolation in their congregations.
Data on suicides in modern Germany come from the
mortality statistics accessible via controlled remote access
(Todesursachenstatistik, EVAS 23211), covering all deaths
at an individual level from 1992 to 2009. These statistics are
based on the death certificate issued by the doctor declaring
the death, in combination with the death registry certifi-
cate issued by the registrar of the municipality of residence.
The death certificate contains information about diseases
and significant other health issues that have contributed to
death. The classification of causes of death follows the World
Health Organization’s International Classification of Dis-
eases (ICD-9 until 1997 and ICD-10 since). In addition to
the primary cause of death, the mortality statistics include
demographic features such as gender, age, German citizen-
ship, marital status, place of residence, date of death, and,
importantly, religion.
We use the years 1992 and 2009, the earliest and lat-
est years available. In 1992, the mortality statistics report
885,374 deaths, out of which 13,459, or 1.5%, are suicides.
In 2009, the number of deaths is 854,544, out of which 9,622,
or 1.1%, are suicides, indicating a considerable decline in the
suicide proportion over the seventeen years.
Between 1992 and 2009, both the Catholic and Protes-
tant churches lost many members due to secessions. But the
share of Protestants leaving the church is nearly 50% higher.
In 1991, Protestant churches had 29.2 million members
and the Catholic Church 27.7 million (Eicken & Schmitz-
Veltin, 2010). The number of members actively seceding
from Protestant churches from 1992 to 2009 (not counting
deaths or other movements) was 3.6 million: 12.2% of the
initial stock left over the course of less than two decades.
In the Catholic Church, the number of members seceding
over the same period was 2.3 million, or 8.2%, of the initial
stock.13 Consequently, former Protestants make up a larger
share of the nonaffiliated, an important factor when assessing
suicide rates by denomination and nonaffiliation.14
Table 7 reports OLS regressions of a suicide indicator
on religious affiliation, controlling for basic demographic
characteristics: a quadratic in age, gender, German citizen-
ship, and marital status.15 In 1992, the regression reveals
that suicide proportions are 0.18 percentage points higher for
Protestants than for Catholics. This estimate is equivalent to
13.7% of the raw Catholic suicide proportion. The suicide
proportion of citizens without religious affiliation is 0.44
percentage points higher than that of Catholics. It thus far
exceeds that of any affiliated deceased, including Protestants.
When county fixed effects are included in the analysis, the
estimates increase to 0.252 percentage points for Protestants
and 0.597 percentage points for the nonreligiously affili-
ated.16 While the higher suicide proneness of Protestants
13 Data source: http://www.kirchenaustritt.de/statistik (accessed July 25,
2014).
14 The pattern of Protestant seceding from their church in higher numbers
is consistent with the religious affiliation data in the mortality statistics.
Among the people who died in 1992, 46.1% were Protestants, 33.9% were
Catholics, and 16.0% were not religiously affiliated. By 2009, the Protestant
share had decreased to 39.9%, the Catholic share had barely changed at
33.2%, and the nonreligiously affiliated had increased to 21.4%.
15 As not only the choice to secede from the church, but also strong postwar
migration waves and increased regional mobility probably undermine the
instrument characteristics of the historical spread of the Reformation for
Protestantism in our modern data, the contemporary analysis stays purely
descriptive.
16 Qualitative results are robust in probit and logit models, although the
estimated marginal effects are somewhat smaller than the OLS estimates
(e.g., 0.167 in the probit and 0.124 in the logit model rather than the 0.252
OLS estimate with county fixed effects, not shown).
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Table 7.—Protestantism and Suicide in Germany, 1992 and 2009
Dependent Variable: Suicidea
1992 2009 West Germany, 1992
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Protestant .180 .252 .027 .143 .215 .217 .213
(.029)∗∗∗ (.034)∗∗∗ (.026) (.030)∗∗∗ (.037)∗∗∗ (.034)∗∗∗ (.037)∗∗∗
Share Protestants in county .244 .046
(.120)∗∗ (.130)
No religious affiliation .443 .597 .161 .381 1.098 1.065 .927 1.062
(.039)∗∗∗ (.049)∗∗∗ (.032)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗ (.125)∗∗∗ (.121)∗∗∗ (.129)∗∗∗ (.122)∗∗∗
Other religious affiliations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age −.314 −.312 −.265 −.263 −.338 −.338 −.339 −.338
(.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
Age squared .140 .138 .113 .111 .155 .155 .156 .155
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Male .720 .715 .738 .731 .702 .702 .703 .702
(.029)∗∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗
German citizenship .423 .417 .112 .163 .162 .155 .199 .155
(.120)∗∗∗ (.122)∗∗∗ (.080) (.081)∗∗ (.206) (.206) (.205) (.206)
Family status controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes No No No
County-level controls No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 885,374 885,374 854,544 854,544 666,261 666,261 666,261 666,261
R2 .032 .033 .029 .030 .038 .037 .037 .037
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. aDependent variable multiplied by 100. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: Significant at ∗10%, ∗∗5%, and ∗∗∗1%. Standard errors in specifications
with county-level controls are clustered at the level of 327 counties. Other religious affiliations: Jewish; Muslim; other Christian; other religion; religion unknown (reference category: Catholic). Family status controls:
single; widowed; divorced; unknown (reference category: married). County-level controls: log(county population); share of county population in twenty separate age groups; share of county population who are single,
widowed, married, divorced; share of foreigners; share of workforce in four separate sectors; share of population receiving social benefits; share of population receiving financial support from relatives; share of
population with five separate educational degrees. Data: Mortality Statistics (Todesursachenstatistik), 1992 and 2009; county-level variables: Population Census (Volkszählung), 1987. See main text and online appendix
C for details.
compared to Catholics is still visible in 1992, the fact that
suicide proneness of those not affiliated with a religion—
which are disproportionately formerly Protestant—is even
higher raises doubts that Protestant religious beliefs are the
predominant factor in the denominational pattern of suicides.
In 2009, the estimate on Protestantism is reduced to an
insignificant 0.03 percentage points, or just 2.8% of the
raw Catholic suicide proportion. With county fixed effects,
the estimate regains statistical significance, but at 0.14 per-
centage points, it is 43% lower than the respective estimate
in 1992. The suicide proportion of those without religious
affiliation remains 0.38 percentage points higher than that
of Catholics. Under the assumption that the most devout
believers in the respective religious doctrines are more
likely to stay in their church, the declining difference in
suicides between Protestants and Catholics again speaks
against a paramount role for the theological explanation.
The continuing fact that religiously nonaffiliated people,
which disproportionately draw on people leaving Protes-
tant churches, have the highest suicides also speaks for a
dominant role of socialization rather than religious beliefs.
The individual-level modern data also allow us to probe
some more into the issue of ecological fallacy. Reli-
gious affiliation at a regional level is available only in
the most recent Population Census (Volkszählung) of 1987,
available for West Germany only. As column 5 indicates,
at 0.215, the point estimate on Protestantism in the 1992
specification with county fixed effects is slightly (although
not statistically significantly) smaller in West Germany than
the equivalent estimate of 0.252 for the whole of Germany.
The estimate barely changes when we replace the county
fixed effects by county-level controls from the 1987 Popu-
lation Census (the shares of the county population in twenty
separate age groups, in four family-status groups, in five
education groups, receiving social benefits, receiving finan-
cial support from relatives, the share of foreigners, the share
of the workforce in four sectors, and log county popula-
tion). When we replace the indicator of individual Protestant
affiliation with the share of Protestants among Protestants
and Catholics in the county, the estimate is very similar
at 0.244. But when we include individual and county-level
Protestant affiliation together, only the individual Protestant
affiliation remains significant, with a point estimate that is
barely affected, while the point estimate on the Protestant
share in the county is reduced to virtually 0. This pattern
suggests that the actual effect stems from the individual affil-
iation, but that estimates based on the county share provide
unbiased estimates of the individual effect. That is, county-
level estimates do not seem to suffer from ecological fallacy,
which is reassuring for our historical analyses.
Finally, modern data also allow us to test whether Protes-
tantism indeed features a more individualistic and less
community-oriented nature than Catholicism, as the basic
hypothesis of the sociological channel suggests. For this,
we use the individual-level data from the German SOEP
in 2003. Catholics are in fact much more likely to go to
church (see table A.10 in the online appendix). Among
Catholics, 20.1% attend church at least weekly and 35.3%
at least monthly, whereas these shares are only 4.9% and
16.3%, respectively, among Protestants. That is, Protestants
are indeed substantially less likely to interact with their
religious community on a regular basis than Catholics, which
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may have detrimental consequences when they are in a suici-
dal state of mind. The lack of cohesion within the religious
community is not compensated by higher social cohesion
outside the religious community. Indeed, Catholics are 2.8
percentage points more likely to visit family or relatives on
a weekly basis and only slightly (1.6 percentage points) less
likely to visit neighbors and friends weekly.17 As another
indicator of social interaction beyond the religious commu-
nity, Catholics are more than 3 percentage points more likely
to go out in cafés or restaurants on a weekly or monthly
basis than Protestants. Overall, these indicators suggest that
the higher suicide proneness of Protestants is indeed related
to a lower incidence of social cohesion, in particular within
the religious community, as suggested by the sociological
channel.18
Strikingly, religiously nonaffiliated individuals show a
lower incidence of community orientation than either
Catholics or Protestants. While they obviously rarely attend
religious events, they are also substantially less likely to reg-
ularly visit family or visit friends than either Catholics or
Protestants. Only with respect to going out for food or drink
are they on a level roughly similar to Protestants. Again, this
pattern is consistent with a sociological explanation for the
greater incidence of suicides among those without a religious
affiliation.
V. Conclusion
This paper studies the effect of Protestantism on suicide
both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we model
sociological and theological mechanisms through which
Protestants are predicted to have higher suicide rates than
Catholics. In the framework of an economic model of sui-
cide, individuals who are in a suicidal mental state compare
the expected utility from living with that from death. Accord-
ing to the sociological aspect of religion based on denomi-
national differences in group structure, as Durkheim (1897)
argued, Protestant doctrine emphasizes religious individu-
alism, whereas Catholics have a more integrated religious
community. As a consequence, Protestants will have a lower
utility from keeping on living and a lower cost of committing
suicide relative to Catholics. To this sociological channel,
we add two mechanisms based on denominational differ-
ences in theological doctrine that derive from a consideration
of afterlife in individuals’ utility maximization. Protestant
doctrine tends to stress that humans cannot affect God’s
decisions by their deeds but depend on God’s grace (sola
gratia), whereas Catholic doctrine grants that human access
to heaven is affected by individual deeds. For Catholics,
committing the deadly sin of suicide reduces the probability
17 There is no noteworthy difference in volunteering in associations or
social services between Protestants and Catholics in these data.
18 Relatedly, using data from 32 countries in the International Social Sur-
vey Programme (ISSP) 1998–1999, Arrunada (2010) shows that Catholics
have a more personalized and Protestants a more impersonal social ethic.
For example, Catholics are significantly more likely to cover up for friends
and to value the importance of family but less likely to trust strangers.
of reaching heaven, thereby lowering the optimality of the
suicide threshold relative to Protestants. Furthermore, since
Catholic doctrine views confession as a holy sacrament but
Protestant doctrine does not, the impossibility of confessing
the sin of suicide creates a substitution effect away from sui-
cide to other possible actions considered by Catholics who
are in a suicidal mental state, again reducing the optimal-
ity of suicide relative to Protestants in that state. Thus, both
sociological and theological differences between Protestants
and Catholics make suicide more likely among Protestants.
When testing the model prediction that Protestantism
increases suicides, our empirical model places particular
emphasis on excluding biases from self-selection of suicide-
prone individuals into religious denominations and from
other forms of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity.
For this, we construct a unique database from suicide sta-
tistics and censuses that cover all Prussian counties in the
early and late nineteenth century. In this setting, we exploit
the concentric dispersion of Protestantism in Prussia in an IV
model that instruments the share of Protestants in a county
by its distance to Wittenberg. We find that Protestantism
increases the average annual suicide rate over the 1869–1871
period by about fifteen to twenty suicides per 100,000 inhab-
itants, a large effect compared to the mean suicide rate of
thirteen suicides per 100,000 inhabitants. The result is robust
to a rich set of controls for demographic, economic, educa-
tional, and geographic background factors. Controls for the
share of insane people in the population and for fatal accident
rates address concerns of bias from denominational differ-
ences in nonrational suicide causes and in underreporting
of suicides. Likewise, we exclude that the higher Protestant
shares identified by our instrument are related to unpleas-
ant weather conditions and that our results are driven by
religious concentration or ecological fallacy. We find a posi-
tive effect of Protestantism on suicide also in the 1816–1821
period, where the effect is larger for men than for women.
Results are further confirmed in a first-difference model of
changes between 1816 and 1871.
Finally, we devise several tests to differentiate between
the sociological and the theological channels. Most impor-
tant, the effect of Protestantism on suicide tends to decrease
rather than increase with church attendance, suggesting
that the sociological role of a more integrated community
dominates the theological aspect of a stronger devotion
to religious beliefs. In addition, the difference in suicides
between Protestants and Catholics recedes in modern data,
whereas nonaffiliated people (predominantly former Protes-
tants) have significantly more suicides, again suggesting a
dominant role for socialization rather than theological belief.
Of course, both sociological and theological mechanisms can
be working at the same time, and confirmative evidence for
one channel does not rule out that the other channel also
plays a role.
The modern results also suggest that affiliation with a
Christian church in general may hedge against suicide risk,
possibly because of a higher degree of social integration in
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Christian communities in general compared to people not
affiliated with any church (but possibly also because athe-
ists do not belief in punishment with loss of afterlife utility,
as depicted in our model). In this sense, our main results
may also be interpreted as a positive effect of Catholicism
on reduced suicide, both relative to Protestantism but in par-
ticular relative to individuals with no religious affiliation,
who may suffer from particularly low levels of perceived
social cohesion. This aspect of the modern data opens an
interesting direction for future research.
In terms of the effect of Protestantism on overall well-
being, our result that Protestantism increases suicide rates
relative to Catholics contrasts with the finding that Protes-
tantism furthers educational and economic development
(Becker & Woessmann, 2009). Thus, the effect of Protes-
tantism on well-being seems to be neither uniformly positive
nor uniformly negative and may affect the average popu-
lation differently from the very select subgroup of people
who are in a suicidal state of mind. In fact, the two aspects
may be related in a dark-contrasts paradox where suicide
behavior is subject to a relative comparison of utility (Daly
et al., 2011). Still, our results hold conditional on proxies
for economic development and inequality, suggesting that
religious denomination in the form of Protestantism is a
main independent driver of regional differences in suicide
rates.
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